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7Reflections on the Regulation of European Securities Markets
When some time ago I accepted the invitation to deliver the 2001 SUERF
Lecture I did not suspect that I would have to start my lecture by apologising
for addressing my chosen topic from a rather special angle. Originally, my
intention was to share some thoughts with you on the major challenges facing
securities regulators in our global financial markets and to think aloud about
the ways and means of meeting these challenges. However, I imagine that
today most of you would find this detached academic approach somewhat
disingenuous on my part. My objective is to discuss five main issues. Firstly,
to review the Committee’s mandate and the way it conducted its investigation.
Secondly, I will discuss the shortcomings of the current legislative and
regulatory process with respect to securities markets’regulation, and therefore
why the Committee was established in the first place. In the process, I will
discuss some of the reasons why the current system works so poorly. This will
be followed by a consideration of the main reform proposals the Committee
recommended. I will then address three particular queries and objectives that
have been raised about our proposals. Finally, I will briefly outline some of the
developments since the Committee reported. Three annexes (from the report)
are included: Annex 1 gives an analysis of the responses received on the Initial
Report of the Committee, and Annexes 2 and 3 outline the Level 1 and Level 2
Consultation and Transparency mechanisms.
The Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities
Markets, which had been set up by ECOFIN in July 2000 and which I was
asked to chair, released its final report on 15 February of this year. On 23
March the Stockholm Summit approved 90 to 95% of our recommendations
and requested that the new regulatory structure should become operational by
the end of this year. I will say more about the residual 5-10% in a later section.
Implementation of our recommendations is now underway. While I am
confident that it will be carried out according to schedule, it is nevertheless
raising problems, and may well raise additional problems in the future. These
problems will have to be solved if the new regulatory process is to produce
a significant improvement over current practice. A commendable feature of
the Stockholm Resolution was that it set out a series of clear principles for the
reform of securities markets regulation. Bad habits, however, do not fade
away gently. It is important, therefore, that investors, issuers of securities and
all market participants keep a watchful eye on the implementation process,
9and speak up whenever they detect deviations from the principles so clearly
agreed in the Stockholm Resolution.
So my paper will be far from detached. I would like to persuade you to lend
your support to the realisation of our Committee’s recommendations
Major Problems: An Overview
The central problem can be summarised quite simply: the current regulatory
system is not working; it is too slow and too rigid, produces too much
ambiguity and fails to make a distinction between core principles and detail.
Insufficient consultation and transparency, plus uneven transposition and
erratic implementation by Member States of agreed Community rules, are real
handicaps.
The development of the EU financial market is hindered by a plethora of
barriers such as:
• the absence of clear Europe-wide regulation on a large number of issues;
• an inefficient regulatory system;
• inconsistent implementation of existing rules;
• a huge number of transactions, clearing and settlement systems;
• the inadequate development of funded pension schemes.
Other factors slowing market integration are: differences in legal systems and
taxation; and political, external trade and cultural barriers.
The lack of basic European rules is a major handicap. This is recognised and
became the heart of the reason for the Financial Services Action Plan, which
should be delivered by 2005 at the latest. The most important gaps are:
• lack of agreed principles covering all financial services legislation;
• failure to make the mutual recognition principle work;
• outdated rules on listing requirements;
• ambiguity over the scope and application of conduct of business rules;
• no appropriate rules to deal with alternative trading systems;
• inconsistencies between the E-commerce Directive and financial services
Directives;
• no comprehensive market-abuse regime;
• no cross-border collateral arrangements;
• no set of common accounting standards;
• outdated investment rules for UCITS and pension funds;
• no agreed take-over rules; etc.
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Let me remind you of what we considered to be our core mandate: to identify
the shortcomings of the current European legislative and regulatory process
in the field of securities markets and to make recommendations on remedies
for these shortcomings. In other words, this was an action-oriented mandate.
We had to start, of course, with fact finding, analysis and assessment. It did
not take us much time to persuade ourselves that significant gains could be
derived from building genuinely integrated, liquid, transparent and efficient
securities markets in the European Union. At the micro level, such benefits
include a more efficient allocation of capital, enhanced liquidity which will
benefit all companies and most especially SMEs, a lower cost of capital,
higher net yields for consumers, and cheaper cross-border (clearing)
settlements. At the macro level a more efficient capital market should enhance
the productivity of capital and labour and contribute to stronger growth and
employment.
Such markets would help raise the productivity of both labour and capital, and
thus contribute to faster growth and job creation. Although this contribution
could be substantial, we fully realised that the radical improvement of
Europe’s growth and employment performance hinged on a number of other
developments as well. Nevertheless, our judgement was that the completion
of the single market programme will bring substantial benefits across the
board. We also judged that an integrated and well-functioning European
capital market is an integral part of the overall single market programme. We
believe that the implementation of the Financial Services Action Plan cannot
in practice be completed by 2004 without the type of reforms our Report
recommends. Reform of capital market regulation is an integral part of
fulfilling the ambitions of the single market in financial services.
We also quickly came to the conclusion that, in contrast with markets for
goods and many services, the single market for financial flows and services
was very far from being a reality, despite progress in some areas. There was
no doubt either that the identified weaknesses or even failures of the
European legislative process bore a major responsibility for the inadequate
degree of financial integration – hence the justification for remedial action.
Quite clearly, however, it was not part of our mandate to make
recommendations on what should, or should not be regulated via European
law-making, and even less on the content of specific Directives or
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that the Financial Services Action Plan was a highly ambitious exercise
requiring considerable legislative work during the coming years. For the sake
of speeding up the process it was essential that priorities be established.
Hence our recommended list of priorities – a sort of by-product of our core
report, albeit an important one.
The priorities within the Financial Services Action Plan which must be
adopted by the end of 2003 are:
• single prospectus for issuers;
• modernised admission to listing;
• home-country control for all wholesale members and a definition of
professional investors;
• modernised investment rules for UCITS and pension funds;
• the adoption of international accounting standards;
• a single passport for recognised stock markets.
The Committee of Wise Men also argues that attention needs to be given to
three crucial parameters:
• convergence of regulatory and supervisory structures;
• restructuring of clearing and settlement led by the private sector in order to
reduce the huge European costs compared to those of the US. If the private
sector fails to deliver an efficient system, a public policy lead will be
needed. A smooth functioning of clearing and settlements is essential for
efficient securities markets and for the infrastructure for monetary policy;
• the management of prudential implications implies the need to strengthen
co-operation at the EU level between regulators and institutions responsible
for micro and macro supervision.
Throughout this initial work of fact finding, analysis and assessment we
always kept in mind that our final report should come up with
recommendations on how to improve, as speedily as possible, the legislative
process and, by implication, the regulatory structures. In short, we felt
ourselves drawn into an exercise in European Governance.
A very substantial part of our work was taken up by consultations. We
consulted investors (« consumers »), end-users (issuers of securities) and the
full range of intermediaries, as well as regulators, and the three main actors
of the legislative process, i.e. the Commission, the Council and Euro MPs.
These consultations took the form of organised hearings and/or receiving
written submissions in response to our questions posted on the Internet.
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leading up to our Initial Report released in November. My original inclination
was to draft a rather anodyne, factual and analytical interim report, suggesting
perhaps alternative courses of action, yet leaving explicit recommendations to
the final report. But we soon came to the conclusion that the shortcomings of
the current system were so obvious, and that there was such a wide consensus
on what these weaknesses were, that we would just waste our very limited
time by digging out more and more evidence confirming the initial findings.
Rather, we judged that we should focus our attention on potential remedies.
As a result I joined those of my much wiser colleagues who had argued from
the outset that we should stick our neck out as early as possible with a view
to provoking genuine reactions from all interested parties: market
participants, regulators, government and Commission officials, Euro MPs
and, indeed, media and the public at large. This is what led us to outline
already in our initial report our four-level reform approach (including the
setting up of the two new committees) which did, indeed, produce widespread
reactions.
We received these reactions during the second wave of consultations in
December 2000 and January 2001 and they were summarised in an annex to
our final report. This is included as Annex 1 to this paper. This helped us to
refine and adjust our initial proposal and to make it more explicitly
operational. It also led us to put a much greater emphasis on the need for
consultation and transparency throughout the whole of the legislative process.
This was the result of our own genuine learning process. In a world of
accelerating innovation, changing structures, in matters so technical yet
having so broad implications for so many people, enterprises and institutions
– let alone for real or perceived national interests – no one can make sensible
recommendations without carefully listening to arguments and being ready to
enter into a genuine dialogue.
Shortcomings of the Current Legislative and Regulatory Process
The basic principles of the current system are quite simple – but the way it
functions in practice is not. The right and duty of taking legislative initiatives
belongs exclusively to the Commission which drafts either a Directive or
a Regulation. This proposal is submitted for co-decision to the Council (i.e. to
Ministers of the Member states – in the area of financial services, to ECOFIN)
and the European Parliament. These legislative bodies approve, amend or
reject the proposal. The practical complexity is due in part to the fact that the
interaction between these three institutions – for instance the amendment
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process. Herein lies one of the problems: these rules are neither simple nor
unambiguous. They are the result of historical developments accompanied
by protracted negotiations. To varying degrees all three institutions dislike
them and try to interpret them according to their own perceived interest.
Another cause of complexity is that the implementation of the legally binding
Directives rests with the administrations of the Member states; and whenever
a Directive contains ambiguous passages these administrations interpret them
to their liking. And, of course, these interpretations may be different between
different jurisdictions which, in some cases, means that, what was originally
designed as a laudable exercise in harmonisation and having markets in
different centres subject to equal regulatory requirements, ends up with
a complex and sometimes differentiated set of rules and procedures.
We have identified a series of major shortcomings of the current system. I will
emphasise three in particular.
To begin with, the legislative process is far too slow. In a number of instances
it has taken three to four years between the time the Commission started
working on a draft Directive and its effective implementation by the Member
states. The worst example is provided by the horror story of the cross-border
take-over proposal which was initiated by the Commission as long ago as
1989 and yet has still not been approved (let alone implemented). However,
everyone would agree that relying on widely differing national legislations in
this crucial area is the best recipe for preventing optimal financial integration
in the European Union.
Second, the legislative process is also far too rigid – by which I mean that
existing Directives (or Regulations) cannot be swiftly adjusted to evolving
market conditions. Every change, however minor or technical, requires a full-
blown Commission proposal to go through the complexities of the lengthy
and creaking co-decision process. Yet we all know that one of the dominant
features of our global financial system is an accelerating pace of change.
Innovation produces almost daily new products and operating techniques ;
and under the combined impact of deregulation and competition nothing can
be taken for granted in terms of financial structures and practices. The fact is
quite simply that we have a decision-making and implementation process in
the area of securities markets regulation which is quite unsuited to a world of
fast-moving innovation and market practices. The process needs to be
reformed to reflect the current environment of substantial and rapid change.
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would even say appallingly poor) quality. In the course of our hearings and in
the written submissions we were given numerous examples of Directives
which display a lack of understanding of how financial markets actually work
in practice. Moreover, the texts are of legendary ambiguity which, as I have
just said, opens the door to inconsistent implementation. There seems to be no
co-ordinated effort to eliminate these inconsistencies, and neither is there
effective enforcement on the part of the Commission.
All these weaknesses and deficiencies are compounded by a plethora of other
complexities, such as clearing and settlement systems that fragment liquidity,
increase costs and present a real barrier to financial market development in
the European Union. Add on to this differences in legal systems (such as
bankruptcy laws), taxation, different cultural approaches to corporate
governance and a lack of identified regulatory priorities, and you have
a remarkable cocktail of Kafkaesque inefficiency that serves no-one – not
consumers, SMEs, large corporations, or governments. It was not within the
remit of our Committee to address these additional complexities although we
could not prevent ourselves from voicing our concern over some of them. As
a result, we focussed our attention on the legislative and regulatory process.
But before outlining the core of our proposals I would like to spend some time
on trying to identify the reasons for the obvious shortcomings of the current
system.
Why Does the Current System Work so Poorly?
It is evidently the case that the current system works very poorly and
inefficiently and is in serious need of reform. There are several reasons for
this.
1. The first, and arguably the most important reason is that the current
system ignores the distinction between primary and  secondary
legislation or, more precisely, between core principles approved by the
legislator and implementation technicalities defined by the executive or
specialised agencies – within the confines of the delegation granted to
them by the legislator. Such a distinction exists in practically all our
national legislative systems, although the terminology used to make the
distinction differs from country to country. In Belgium, for instance,
a law voted by the Parliament is implemented via an ‘arrêté royal
d’exécution’. Because there is no such distinction in European law, the
Commission has to draft frighteningly long and exceedingly detailed
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the European Parliament.
The consequences are dramatic. They derive, first, from the fact that the
two legislative bodies are prevented from concentrating on what should
be their primary task and for which they are qualified: to decide, after
careful debate, what are the core political principles – the ‘essential
elements’ – of each Directive or Regulation. These basic principles are
lost in the swamp of details and technicalities. Second, the Commission
itself is drawn into drafting such details without possessing the expertise
for efficiently carrying out this task.
May I come back for a minute to the story of the unfortunate cross border
take-over Directive? This Directive has now got stuck because – after
almost twelve years – it appeared that the European Parliament (under
the leadership of its German members) wanted to retain the right of the
management of a targeted company to reject a hostile take-over bid
without consulting its shareholders (for instance, by using the ‘poison
pill’defence tactic). The question of whether or not the ultimate decision
lies with the shareholders is very much a matter of ‘core principle’. Had
this issue, together with the other core principles, been put squarely to the
two legislative bodies right at the beginning of the legislative process, the
conflict would have emerged with clarity from the outset. Although it
would not necessarily have been solved with ease, at least the legislators
would have had to assume their political responsibility for making their
choice between conflicting principles at the outset – not after a decade of
haggling. In other words, a clearer focus on ‘core principles’at the outset
of the process would enable disputes to be identified early on, and the
nature of the important decisions would be transparent at the beginning
of the process. We need to make a clearer distinction between primary
and secondary legislation because the present lack of a clear distinction
provides an optimum breeding ground for poor legislation, confusion and
a slow legislative process.
It also bears the major responsibility for the rigidity of the system.
Speedy adjustment to the evolving financial scene means adjustment of
the implementation technicalities – not of the core principles. But none
of the three institutions is qualified to handle this adjustment within the
present system. The Commission is far too removed from the
practicalities of the market place to be able to detect the need for
a change; and even if it happened to make the right proposal at the right
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on the appropriateness of the proposal.
2. The second reason for the shortcomings of the current system is its
basically ‘top down’ approach. The initiative to legislate is taken by the
Commission whenever it considers, from a broad European angle, that
there is a need to legislate and that there is a constitutional basis for doing
so. The proposal it makes is then debated by government representatives
– officials from finance ministries – and Euro MPs, mostly the active
members of the European Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs
Committee.
I have no doubt that when core principles are at stake representatives of
the three institutions must play their full role, as I have argued just a few
minutes ago. That is their right and duty. But even here I feel that they
should make ample use of advice coming from ‘below’, i.e. from
practitioners close to the realities of the market – be they regulators or
market participants. To set in motion a legislative process requires
information: on the pros and cons of legislating at all at the European
level; on the main elements of such legislation; and on the guiding
principles. And when the debate starts on a draft from the Commission,
both legislative bodies would be well advised to listen to the reactions of
all the interested parties. This consultation process is important because
it should at least minimise the risk of making serious errors, and should
alert the law-makers to some of the likely consequences of their rules and
legislation. This does not, of course, mean that the law-maker should
respond to all the comments made: indeed, that would be impossible
given their sometimes contradictory nature. It does, however, mean that
law-makers should have access to informed comment. This means that
there would be advantage in having explicit mechanisms for public
consultation.
When it comes to secondary legislation, the deficiencies of the ‘top
down’ approach become even more obvious. The very nature of
implementing technicalities, and their timely adjustment to changing
market circumstances, requires a type of organisation in which those
capable of giving advice should be entitled to take the initiative. By
doing this, ‘top down’would begin to closely resemble ‘bottom up’.
The information gathered from our hearings, and also from the written
submissions we received, suggests that consultation has so far been
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opportunity to make their voice heard only after the publication of a draft
proposal. Moreover, only very rarely does such consultation turn into
a genuinely interactive dialogue.
3. The current legislative process is remarkably opaque. This does not apply
to the part played by the European Parliament, which deserves praise for
practising full transparency. But it does apply to the role of the
Commission and even more to the activities of the Council. This lack of
transparency has two deplorable consequences.
One is that, even when there is consultation, this cannot yield optimal
results: for how can the consulted practitioners form an operationally
useful view on matters under discussion when they do not know how the
discussion is progressing among member states and inside the
Commission as well as between the Council and the Commission? And
how can they defend what they perceive to be their legitimate interest
without knowing who defends what argument? Consultation and
transparency are twin requirements. Genuine consultation requires
transparency; but how can there be transparency if there is no
consultation?
Second, the lack of transparency has a debilitating effect on the quality
of the legislative process. It encourages behind-the-scene compromises
in which participants in the decision-making process accept a deal in the
hope of deriving a benefit from a reciprocal concession in a field totally
unrelated to the working of securities markets. Politics (or simply human
nature) being what they are, it would be unrealistic to hope that such
across-the-border concessions could be eliminated, but it is worth trying
to reduce their frequency. Transparency can contribute to achieving this
objective.
The Main Components of our Regulatory Reform Proposal
The Committee believes there is a need for all financial services and
securities legislation to be based on a conceptual framework of overarching
principles. The most important could be:
• to maintain confidence in European securities markets;
• to maintain high levels of prudential supervision;
• to contribute to the efforts of macro and micro prudential supervisors to
ensure systemic stability;
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different degrees of risk involved;
• to respect the subsidiary principles of the Treaty;
• to promote competition and ensure that the Community’s competition rules
are fully respected;
• to ensure that regulation is efficient as well as encouraging, not
discouraging, innovation;
• to take account of the European, as well as the wider international
dimension of securities markets.
The core of our proposal centres around a four level approach to the
regulation of European Securities markets.
The Level 1 legislative acts should concentrate on the core political principles:
the ‘essential elements’of each Directive or Regulation. The Council and the
European Parliament, acting on a proposal from the Commission, would agree
on the key political Directive and orientation for each subject. Most important,
the Council and the European Parliament would agree on the nature and the
extent of the implementing measures to be decided at the second level. The split
between Level 1 framework principles and Level 2 implementing measures
will have to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Let me emphasise again how important I believe it is that the Commission
should consult, in a very open, transparent and systematic way, before making
its Level 1 proposal. With this in mind, Annex 2 below outlines the
consultation and transparency mechanisms for Level 1 as contained in the
Committee’s final report.
Level 2 is composed of an actively functioning network of national securities
regulators, the Commission and a European Securities Committee to define,
propose and decide on the implementing details of framework Directives and
Regulations which have been determined by the co-decision procedure in
Level 1.
This implies the setting up of two new committees:
• An EU Securities Committee (ESC) whose central role would be to act as
a regulatory committee under Article 202 of the Treaty, in which the
Commission’s proposal would be voted on with a short, fixed deadline. The
Member states should nominate members to the ESC, which the
Commission would chair.
• An EU Securities Regulators Committee (ESRC) which in Level 2 would
act as an advisory committee to the European Commission. Its members
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regulation designated by each Member state – building on the structure
already successfully established by FESCO.
The role of the ESC would be to:
• act as a Regulatory Committee where the Commission’s proposal would be
voted within a fixed deadline of 3 months;
• act in an advisory capacity to the Commission for the Level 1 legislation;
• advise the Commission on Level 2 mandates for the ESRC.
The membership of ESC has to be at a high level. Collegiality and ‘esprit de
corps’ are considered as very important. The role of the ESRC would be
twofold:
• in Level 2, to be an independent advisory group to the Commission;
• in Level 3, to act as a fully independent committee of national regulators to
ensure a more consistent implementation of Community Law.
The ESRC must be composed of national regulators. Four basic procedures
must be followed for ESRC consultation:
• consultation on the basis of a concept release (3 months);
• consultation with markets and end-users on the basis of a draft proposal
(3 months);
• hearings, roundtables, internet;
• public comments should be appended to each of the ESRC’s final
recommendations.
The working method in Level 2 could be summed up as follows. In the light
of the Level 1 co-decision process, the Commission would ask the ESRC to
begin work on the implementation details and agree a timeframe for the work
to be carried out. After having consulted market participants, the ESRC would
forward its advice to the Commission, which would consider this advice and
forward its proposal to the ESC, which would then vote on the proposal.
I would like to insist on three important points made in our Report:
• The European Parliament must be kept fully informed throughout the
process, in line with inter-institutional agreements;
• The consultations carried out by the ESRC should be open, transparent and
inter-active; Annexe 3 below outlines the Committee’s proposals for the
consultation process with respect to the ESRC;
• Both the ESC and ESRC must be high level committees.
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Parliament it is proposed:
• to keep the European Parliament fully informed;
• to give the European Parliament time to check the proposal before ESC
votes;
• to ensure that the Commission takes utmost account of any European
Parliament resolution against the proposal;
• to give an adequate role to the European Parliament.
Now let me come to Level 3 in which the Levels 1 and 2 European legislation
is transposed and implemented in the Member states. At this stage the ESRC
puts on a different hat: it acts no longer as an adviser to the Commission, but
assumes the more ‘independent’role of ensuring consistent transposition and
implementation. The fact that the ESRC plays a key role in the process of
defining the Level 2 component of the Directives is likely to go a long way
towards ensuring that it can be an efficient co-ordinator of the transposition
process.
In  Level 3 the objective is to improve day-to-day transposition and
implementation. ESRC is more independent and voting by unanimity is
necessary. The role of the ESRC is:
• to produce consistent guidelines for administrative regulations;
• to issue joint interpretative recommendations and common standards;
• to compare and review regulatory practices;
• to carry out peer reviews.
An important and immediate condition of the ESRC to be able to perform its
dual role is that those mandated by the national regulatory authorities should
have both the knowledge to carry out their work and the ability to deliver
from the very outset the undertakings on which they have agreed. In the
longer run, a more fundamental convergence is necessary among European
regulatory structures – for the simple reason that differences in these
structures make it cumbersome for the national authorities to co-operate
within the ESRC. At the moment there are several important differences in
these structures: the areas covered; the degree of autonomy of regulators; and
not least the way in which market participants are involved in the regulatory
process. These issues need to be addressed.
Level 4 is that of enforcement. We propose to strengthen the enforcement of
Community rules. All actors have a part to play here, but the major
Reflections on the Regulation of European Securities Markets 21responsibility falls on the Commission, which has the legal duty to act as
guardian of the European treaties.
This four-level approach is represented by a chart taken over from our Report,
and reproduced below.
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After its release on 15 February, our Report received a broadly positive
welcome. However, there have been quite a few queries and some objections
have been raised. Let me try to respond to three of the major concerns that
have emerged:
1. The proposed framework is far too complex – especially as regards the
interaction between the Commission, the ESC and the ESRC.
To some extent the complexity of our design is more apparent than real. In
writing our final report we responded to ECOFIN’s request to ‘clarify and
refine’ the regulatory framework suggested in our initial report and
‘propose operational recommendations’. Describing in some detail the
operation of any system is bound to appear complicated, even if the
operation can in fact be quite simple. Amanual summing up instructions of
how to ride a bicycle may look frighteningly complex, yet five-year-olds
can be expert bicycle riders.
At the same time I do not deny that, in some respects, our proposed
reform is not simple. But there are reasons for this. We are not dealing
here with some broad guidelines governing gentlemen’s agreements but
with a legislative process. Any such process requires careful and precise
description, and has to find its place in an existing legal environment.
Moreover, this is European law-making; and whether we like it or not,
the European Union is a highly complex organisation.
2. Why does the Report refrain from recommending the setting up of
a single European securities regulator?
The Report refrained from recommending it in the present circumstances,
for two good reasons. First, because no such regulator could operate
today without the gaping holes in the European financial legislation
being filled-in in the first place. It is conceivable that a single regulator
would be endowed with the authority to interpret core principles or to
define Level 2 implementation technicalities, but it is unthinkable that it
could become a legislator deciding on Level 1 framework principles.
The second reason is that setting up a single European regulator would
require a new Treaty (in the same way as the European Central Bank
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negotiation, drafting and ratification of a new Treaty would take several
years – yet the reform of the current system is of the utmost urgency.
Without such a reform the implementation of the Financial Services
Action plan cannot be completed by 2004, and even less brought
forward, partly at least, to 2003. We saw no alternative to submitting
reform proposals within the confines of the existing Treaty.
Some might object that this need not have prevented our Committee from
outlining the profile of a potential single regulator. This would have been
in line with the very last sentence of our Report which says that ‘if the
full review were to confirm in 2004 (or earlier as the case may be) that
the approach did not have any prospect of success, it might be
appropriate to consider a Treaty change, including the creation of a single
EU regulatory authority for financial services generally in the
Community’. We did not volunteer to outline any such profile. This
would have required a careful and very thorough analysis for which we
simply had no time. I also believe that such an exercise, however
carefully qualified by liberally using ‘if’ and ‘when’, would have
derailed the constructive discussion of our reform proposal.
3. Why should the proposed regulatory framework be able to function
properly when success hinges on the change of behaviour of the very
same actors – Commission, Council, European Parliament – who bear
a shared responsibility for the shortcomings of the present system?
It is recognised that simply changing institutional structures does not in
itself guarantee the right policies. In the final analysis, it is what
regulators, legislators, etc. do that is important rather than which
agencies do it. So I accept that this question is, indeed, a major concern
which should not be dismissed lightly. Hence our repeated insistence
throughout our Report to:
• give a clear mandate to the two key Level 2 committees;
• ensure full transparency of the system, coupled with deadlines in the
decision making bodies;
• throughout the whole legislative process to consult regularly with
market participants and consumers;
• implement strong monitoring and reporting to the Council,
Commission and Parliament, and to the public at large.
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In its Resolution on 23 March 2001, the European Council endorsed the
essential features of our proposal, including our call for a ‘full an open review
in 2004’, and requested that the new regulatory structure should be
operational from the beginning of 2002 at the latest.
On one specific point, however, the Resolution did not follow our
recommendation. We suggested that the Securities Committee (ESC) should
vote by qualified majority on proposals coming from the Commission, and
that the votes should be weighted in the manner set out in the Treaty for the
votes in Council. This implied that it would be highly unlikely that a proposal
emanating from the Commission and based on the advice received from the
ESRC would be rejected by the ESC. In my discussions with Euro MPs
I argued that this would demonstrate the willingness of governments to grant
concessions in order to make the proposed system effectively operational.
In Stockholm, however, the Commission watered down our proposal
regarding the voting procedure, mainly under pressure from the German
government. As a result, in its resolution the European Council noted that ‘the
Commission has committed itself, in order to find a balanced solution for
those cases of implementing measures in the field of securities markets
acknowledged in the light of discussions to be particularly sensitive, to avoid
going against predominant views which might emerge within the Council, as
to the appropriateness of such measures’. What are ‘predominant views’? It
presumably means less than qualified majority, since otherwise there would
have been no reason for asking the Commission to make this commitment.
Does it therefore mean a simple majority? Or the views of one or several
‘predominant’ countries? And how will the interested investors, issuers and
market participants learn about the emergence of such views?
This departure from our original proposal has not created a healthy climate
for finding a solution to the Parliament’s request to be granted a ‘call-back’or
‘parliamentary override’provision relating to the Level 2 measures. We were
persuaded by the legal advice we received that a formal call-back provision
would be incompatible with the current institutional arrangements. I believe,
on the other hand, that if our Committee’s recommendations are properly
implemented, the Parliament will be able to have a significant impact on the
Level 2 decision-making process. Let me spell out (as we did in our report)
what should be the three main features, in this respect, of a ‘proper’
implementation:
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• sufficient time for the Parliament to check that the decisions are in line with
the scope of the implementing measures it agreed to;
• if the Parliament believes that the Commission is exceeding its
implementing powers it should be able to pass a resolution. Were it to do so,
the Commission would be required to re-examine its proposal and should
take the utmost account of the Parliament’s position. It would be
inconceivable if it did not.
Acceptance of these recommendations would give the Parliament – de facto
though admittedly not de jure – something that comes very close to
a parliamentary override. For we should keep in mind that Level 2 decisions
are to be decided on a case-by-case basis. This means that if the Parliament
were dissatisfied with the Commission’s reaction, the consequences would be
felt next time a request for Level 2 implementing powers were made.
Given the importance of reform of securities markets regulation, my own
wish (and hope) is that the proposed framework is given a fair chance to
function during the next two years which are so crucial for the
implementation of the Financial Services Action Plan. This implies that the
Parliament does effectively play the delegation game at the same time as
governments refrain in practice from reminding the Commission that it has
accepted the ‘predominant views’concession. For the rest, the commitment to
undertake a ‘full and open review’in 2004 should be interpreted to imply the
willingness to address with an open mind whatever concerns may have
remained in the minds of Euro MPs regarding the functioning of the new
system. Most importantly, it should also imply that consideration will be
given to the formal introduction of a two-level legislative procedure.
Concluding Remarks
I have noted that our legislative and regulatory approach has been received
with interest, well beyond the world of finance, by all those who find the
present system of governance in the European Union unsatisfactory. I am not
qualified to argue that our approach should be extended to other areas of
European legislation and regulation – for the simple reason that the approach
which we proposed is not the result of putting into practice pre-conceived
ideas about the generally desirable features of European governance. Rather,
it emerged – admittedly quickly – from the observation that in the specific
field of financial services the current system was working very poorly indeed.
The impression of dysfunction in this field has however been so strong and
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legislation, ‘top down’procedures, lack of transparency and consultation – so
blatant that the prevalence of similar weaknesses seems to me likely to be
widespread. Whether this is true or not should, however, be checked by
looking into the working of the legislative and regulatory practices in other
areas as well. The debate about the global reform of governance in the
European Union badly needs the support of empirical evidence.
This is the more so since the balance of power between the three institutional
poles – Council, Commission, Parliament – is in a state of flux. Part of these
uncertainties is understandable and probably unavoidable, given the unique
features of the European integration process. But with 2004 on the horizon,
these uncertainties are now reaching a degree that can become genuinely
detrimental to any legislative and regulatory initiative. The possibility, indeed
the likelihood, of changes in the balance of power induces defensive reactions
on the part of all three institutions. Whatever deal is made today can serve as
a precedent for more systematic changes in 2004. This is vividly illustrated by
the fact that the European Council resolution on the Commission’s commitment
regarding the ‘predominant views’goes on to say that ‘this commitment shall
not constitute a precedent’– while we all know that the commitment itself was
requested on the basis of a former precedent (the so-called ‘aerosol’clause).
Again, we cannot hope to eradicate these defensive reactions; but their
deleterious consequences could perhaps be limited by introducing more
factual evidence into the important debate on governance. And again,
I emphasise the need for active consultation at all stages.
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Analysis of the Comments on the Initial Report of the Committee of
Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets
Summary
Forty one replies have been received, most of them from the private sector.
All the respondents welcome the general thrust of the Committee’s initial
report. They consider it as a valuable contribution to the policy debate. They
all share the analysis of the current situation contained in Chapters I, II and
III of the initial report. They also share the view that urgent steps must be
adopted in order to remove barriers to the integration of the European
financial market.
Most of the replies focus on the possible approach for European Regulation
described in Chapter IV of the initial report.
There is a general agreement that a more efficient, flexible and faster
legislative process is needed. Responses nevertheless insist that faster
legislation should not be at the expense of the quality of the regulatory
system.
Respondents also support the main lines of the proposed institutional and
regulatory framework. However the objectives have to be defined. The
distinction between primary and secondary technical legislation needs to be
delineated clearly. Political willingness will be necessary to achieve this
objective.
Most of the respondents called for a more detailed analysis of the regulatory
approach with practical examples in the final report.
The main issues raised by the respondents:
291. Guiding principles for the new regulatory framework
Most of the respondents consider that the following principles need to be
applied:
– Transparency of the whole legislative process is seen as fundamental. This
implies early publication of preliminary thinking about policy, open
consultation methods, the publication of agendas, the publication of
minutes and documents of meetings, the establishment of forum/technical
groups, organisation of conferences, roundtables, etc. The European
Institutions and the new regulatory model should therefore adopt these
working methods. Respondents also called for the Securities and Regulators
Committees to set out these principles as a rule.
– Openness. Market practitioners and consumers should be involved in the
legislative process through early and continuous consultation.
– Accountability. The democratic accountability of the Securities and
Regulators Committees is seen as of vital importance. Respondents stated
there must be adequate accountability mechanisms to fully inform the
European Parliament. Different variants were suggested, such as hearings in
front of the Parliament, regular reporting and the granting of observer status
to the European Parliament in the Securities Committee.
Table 1: Comments on the New Approach Set out in the Initial Report
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General opinion on the initial report Full support of all respondents
Role of regulation/level of regulation Need for a balance; avoid over-regulation
Guiding principles Transparency, openness, accountability and
flexibility
New approach of the Widespread support for the concept of a 
legislative system four-level system
6 Level 1
6 Level 2 Need for a clear definition of basic objectives
6 Level 3
6 Level 4 Need for a clear distinction between primary and
secondary legislation
Regulations/Directives No clear positions expressed
Role of national regulators Need for harmonization of competences
General support for increased co-operation
Transparency Needs to be set out as a guiding principle
Role of market participants Early and institutionalised involvement 
/consumers in the legislative process
Enforcement Need for increased resources for the Commission2. Possible four-level approach
A small number of respondents argued that the adoption of a set of principles
and objectives applying to all securities legislation would be useful for
assessing future legislation.
(a) Level 1
The adoption of Level 1 legislation is considered to be crucial to the success
of the new approach. A clear distinction must therefore be drawn between
primary and secondary legislation (principles in Level 1, implementing
details in Level 2). This may vary depending on the subject. Level 1 should
contain „essential elements“: fundamental principles which are unlikely to
require amendment in the short or the medium term.
On the type of legislation, the suggestion to move from Directives to
Regulations was also mentioned. Nevertheless, respondents did not set out
clear preferences for either.
(b) Level 2
The final report should expand on some of the key points, such as:
• The role, the objectives and the working procedures of both Committees
There is a general consensus that a set of objectives should be drafted to
define the competence of both Committees. The need for transparency and
co-operation with market-practitioners should guide their work and
deliberations. Several respondents expressed concerns about transposing
FESCO’s working methods to the EU institutional framework. They
therefore called for more details on the working procedures of the
Regulators Committee.
• The composition of the Regulators Committee
As there is not a common template for supervision, the composition of the
Regulators Committee raises major issues, and some concerns. For
example, the Competent Authorities that should advise the Commission in
Level 2 might be current FESCO members. The missions and competence
of national regulators vary considerably among the Member States. Prior
harmonization of the national regulatory functions would therefore be
desirable.
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European Parliament (EMAC)
The respondents called for the role of the European Parliament to be
respected in order to keep the legislative process open, accountable and
democratic. Different models are proposed, such as the full accountability
to Parliament of the Securities Committee, and the obligation to regularly
report the activities of the Committees.
Table 2: Comments on the New Institutional Framework
(c) Level 3
Most respondents consider that differences in the competences and powers of
national supervisory authorities hinder the consistent application of EU
legislation and effective international co-operation. Agreat majority of replies
indicate that prior harmonization of the national regulators competences is
seen as necessary, as well as a thorough revision of the division of
responsibilities between supervisory authorities and exchanges.
(d) Level 4
The lack of enforcement by the Commission is seen as having been a serious
obstacle to the completion of a single market for financial services. Proposals
for an increase in the enforcement resources and instruments for the
Commission should be considered in the final report.
3. Other comments
Respondents have also submitted comments on the other preliminary
conclusions of the initial report.
These are summarized in the following table:
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Securities Committee General support for its establishment.
It needs to be accessible and transparent
Regulators Committee Demand for more details on its role and
composition
Role of European Parliament Its rights should be preserved. Accountability of
the Securities Committee to it is recommended
Links between both Committees More details are requested
Comments on FESCO Criticism on the lack of transparency
Single European Supervisor General agreement that it would be premature to 
create it for the time beingTable 3: Other Comments on the Preliminary Conclusions
Some additional comments deal with the main technical issues contained in
the initial report.
These are summarized in the table below:
Table 4: Additional Comments
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Economic benefits Agreement on the proposal to carry out a proper
study of the benefits
Trade issues Endorsement of the Wise Men’s analysis and
suggestion to address these issues more
prominently in the final report
Market volatility Suggestions to exclude any assessment of
volatility from the final report
The FSAP General agreement to accelerate the completion
of the FSAP to 2004. The EU needs to ensure
that faster legislation does not mean lower
quality legislation
Clearing and Settlement Suggestions to remove the obstacles necessary
for the completion of a European market. Others
express some doubts concerning the initial
report’s assessment of the savings that could be
generated by an integrated clearing and
settlement system. Some raise competition
questions. Most of the respondents consider that
market forces should drive the consolidation
process.
Country of origin and  Some replies insist on the immediate and
mutual recognition widespread implementation of these principles,
notably for wholesale markets
Alternative trading systems Request for the establishment of a level playing
field between the exchanges
OTC market Further regulation of the OTC markets
considered unnecessary and undesirable
Categorization of investors Differentiation between investors generally
considered useful and necessaryANNEX 2
Level 1 Consultation and Transparency mechanisms
The European Commission alone has the right of initiative under the Treaty.
However the Committee recommends that in the future, before the
Commission draws up a proposal in these areas, it should take the following
steps:
1
1. Consult, beforehand, in an open, transparent and systematic way with
market participants and end-users (issuers and consumers). Deadlines
should be set and made clear. Where necessary, open hearings should be
held. There should be a strengthened and open dialogue with market
participants and end-users so as to advise the Commission on a continuous
basis on Level 1 work. Use of the Internet should be used to encourage
more participation. A summary of the consultation process undertaken
should be made available when the final proposal is made. The Committee
recognizes that this will take a little time to set up and that there are
resource implications for the Commission services.
2. Continue to consult Member States and their regulators on an informal
basis as early as possible on any impending Level 1 proposals.
3. Inform the European Parliament on an informal basis of forthcoming
proposals (including more systematic use of the „2005“ group)
2 and seek,
wherever possible, early, non-binding, understandings on the scope of any
implementing powers that might be delegated to Level 2. This will help
guide the European Commission, the Regulators and Securities
Committees on the scope of the work that they should undertake, preparing
them, where possible, in advance of any formal co-decision agreement in
order to gain time.
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1 See, inter alia, paragraph 9 of the Protocol, on the application of principles of subsidiarity
and proportionality annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam (O.J. C340, 10/11/1997, p. 0105)
2 The „2005 Group“ is an informal high level group composed of the chairperson of
European and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament; the Presidency of the
Council of Ministers, the incoming Presidency and the European Commission.ANNEX 3
Consultation procedures and transparency
The Committee considers that the ESRC must consult market participants,
consumers and end-users according to a fixed, preferably mandatory set of
procedural rules that should be set out in its statutes and rules of procedure.
The following principles should apply to the consultation process:
– market practitioners must be involved .
– at every level ...
– in a continuous process ...
– with particular weight given to those with knowledge and expertise on the
subject in question ...
– in an open process, using, inter alia, the Internet ...
– with end-users views being considered at the same time.
The Committee considered the merit of „practitioner forums“ at European
level, but given the complexity of deciding who should be members, bearing
in mind that there are 15 Member States (and soon more) as well as a wide
range of interests to be covered, the Committee prefers the alternative
outlined below.
Once advice on implementing measures has been requested from the
European Commission, and with a specified timeframe agreed for the work,
the ESRC would set up the consultation process.
Four basic procedures could be envisaged:
– In the case of complex issues, the ESRC should consult first on the basis
of a „concept release“ – outlining the problem and the options and asking
for public input on what, if any, regulatory approach would be appropriate.
The time for such a consultation should not exceed 3 months.
– Once a regulatory approach had been decided, a draft proposal would be
released by the ESRC for consultation with markets and end users
(3 months maximum).
37– Where necessary the ESRC could use hearings, or roundtables, as this
Committee has done. Use of the Internet should be compulsory for the
consultation process.
– A summary of the public comments should be appended to each of the
ESRC’s final recommendations.
The Committee recommends the Commission to maintain a similar level of
transparency and openness as these proposals move to the Securities
Committee.
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